The Association Between –Market Risk Disclosure Reporting And Firm Risk: The Impact Of SEC FRR No. 48 by Lin, Chen-Miao et al.
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2010 Volume 26, Number 4 
35 
The Association Between –Market Risk 
Disclosure Reporting And Firm Risk:   
The Impact Of SEC FRR No. 48 
Chen-Miao Lin, Clayton State University, USA 
Wanda Lee Owens, Clark Atlanta University, USA 
James E. Owers, Georgia State University, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
SEC FRR No. 48 requires that all firms report their market risk exposures using one or more of 
three alternative formats for disclosure: tabular format, sensitivity analysis, or Value at Risk 
(VaR).  In this paper we examine how the method chosen affects a firm’s risk as measured by total 
risk, the cost of equity, and firm specific risk.  We find that firms using VaR have higher total risk 
and firm specific risk than firms using sensitivity analysis.  Conversely, firms employing tabular 
disclosure generally have lower but not statistically significant lower total risk, cost of equity, and 
firm specific risk than firms using sensitivity.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
n January 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Financial Reporting Release No. 48 
(FRR No. 48), which required firms to disclose their quantitative market risk information relating to 
attributes such as interest rate risk, foreign currency risk, commodity risk, and other relevant market rate or 
price risk.  The SEC provided three methodologies for disclosure of the information: tabular, sensitivity analysis, 
and Value at Risk (VaR). The requirement tries to make the firm’s market risk exposures transparent to the 
investors. However, when choosing the method, a firm considers the benefits and costs of disclosure. 
 
The potential benefits of risk disclosure are due to a reduction in asymmetric information. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) argue that the problem of asymmetric information between managers and shareholders leads firms to 
obtain external finance at a premium to compensate investors for the potential ―lemons‖ problem. Asymmetric 
information also exacerbates the estimation error problem and the cost of equity as argued by Barry and Brown 
(1985), Coles and Loewenstein (1988), and Coles, Loewenstein, and Suay (1995). The basic argument is that for 
claimholders to estimate their required rates of return, they have to rely on some valuation models that are based on 
estimates of earnings and cash flows. However, parameter uncertainty coming from risk exposures of interest rates, 
exchange rates, and commodity prices leads claimholders to encounter some possible estimation errors. If estimation 
error is nondiversifiable, i.e. is systematic, reducing asymmetric information leads to a lower cost of equity. 
 
However, the perceptions of the SEC disclosure requirements prior to the implementation of the ruling 
were that the disclosure would be costly, that the disclosure forces firms to divulge proprietary information to their 
competitors, and may lead other firms to stop hedging altogether.  As General Motors put it, "If GM disclosed the 
volume of its commodity derivatives contracts and their anticipated cash flows, a competitor could calculate the 
purchase price of GM's components." (Wall Street Journal 6/25/1996).  
 
In this paper, we examine the association between the method chosen for reporting market exposures and 
firm risk as measured by total risk, the cost of equity (systematic risk) and firm specific risk. Specifically, we 
examine whether one of the disclosure methods reveals more information to the market and thus reduces the firm’s 
risk. 
I 
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We find that firms using VaR have higher total risk and firm specific risk, but the cost of equity is not 
greater than that for firms using sensitivity analysis. We also find that firms using VaR and other method(s) (76% of 
the firms in this category choosing VaR and sensitivity) have higher total, cost of equity, and firm specific risk than 
firms choosing sensitivity analysis. This finding is supported by risk expert Leslie Rahl who stated ―VaR is a single 
number as opposed to detailing your position, so you're (revealing) less to the competition‖ We also find firms that 
use tabular format generally have lower but insignificantly total, cost of equity, and firm specific risk than firms 
choosing sensitivity analysis. This is consistent with the comment letters sent to SEC that tabular format presents 
detailed and disaggregated information. Our results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 Summary of the Results 
This table summarizes our main results. In this table, we compare the risk of a firm choosing tabular, VaR, and multiple methods 
to report its risk exposures with that of a firm choosing sensitivity. Risk is measured by total risk, cost of equity, and firm-
specific risk. Total risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by 2521/2. Cost of equity is measured 
by Fama and French three-factor and CAPM models. Firm specific risk is the annualized standard deviation of residuals from the 
Fama and French three-factor and CAPM models multiplied by 2521/2. Lower (higher) indicates the risk measure is lower 
(higher) than that of the firm choosing sensitivity.  
 
Method  Risk 
  Total Risk  Cost of equity  Firm Specific Risk 
VaR  Higher  Higher (insignificant)  Higher 
Tabular  Lower (insignificant)  Lower (insignificant)1  Lower (insignificant) 
VaR and Other Method(s)   Higher  Higher2  Higher 
Sensitivity and Tabular  Higher (insignificant)  Lower (insignificant)3  Higher (insignificant) 
1. Higher but insignificant for the cost of equity estimated by CAPM. 
2. Insignificant for the cost of equity estimated by CAPM. 
3. Higher but insignificant for the cost of equity estimated by CAPM. 
 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the Financial Reporting Release No. 48 disclosure 
requirements. Section 3 reviews the pertinent literature.  The data and sample are described in section 4 and the 
methodologies employed in section 5.  In section 6, the results of the empirical analysis are presented and 
interpreted.  We conclude in section 7. 
 
2.  FINANCIAL REPORTING RELEASE NO. 48 DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS  
 
As previously noted, financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR No. 48) requires firms to disclose their 
quantitative market risk information relating to attributes such as interest rate risk, foreign currency risk, commodity 
risk, and other relevant market rate or price risk by using one or more of three methodologies: tabular, sensitivity 
analysis, and Value at Risk (VaR). 
 
The regulation requires firms choosing tabular methods to present information sufficient to allow investors 
to make estimates of the firm’s market risk exposures. The information presented in the tabular format should 
include the market risk sensitive instruments’ expected cash flows for each of the next five years, and the aggregate 
cash flows expected for the remaining years thereafter.  Those using tabular format must also provide information 
on fair value and contract terms, such as notional amounts of derivatives, and weighted average interest rates of the 
market risk sensitive instruments. For example, Exhibit 1 shows Kroger’s interest rate exposure in tabular format on 
its 10-K filing for fiscal year ended on January 29, 2005. For fixed and variable debt instruments, Kroger reported 
principal amounts and weighted average interest rates maturing from 2005 to 2009 and an aggregated total for all 
years after 2009. Kroger also reported fair value of its debt instruments at the fiscal year end. For interest rate swaps, 
Kroger reported the types of swaps (variable to fixed and fixed to variable swaps), notional amounts and weighted 
average pay and receive rates by expected maturity dates, and fair value. 
 
Sensitivity analysis requires firms to expresses the potential loss in future earnings, fair values, or cash 
flows from selected hypothetical changes in market rates and prices. The regulation requires a firm choosing 
sensitivity analysis to provide a description of the model, assumptions, and parameters used to conduct sensitivity 
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analysis. Exhibit 2 presents the sensitivity analysis reported by Best Buy on its 10-K filing for the fiscal year ending 
February 26, 2005. It reported that a one percentage point increase in interest rates would result in a $4 million 
increase in interest expense. 
 
Value at Risk (VaR) expresses the potential loss in future earnings, fair values, or cash flows from market 
movements over a selected period of time and with a selected likelihood of occurrence. A firm choosing VaR is 
required to report the model used e.g., variance/covariance, historical simulation, or Monte Carlo simulation and 
assumptions and parameters, e.g. holding periods and confidence intervals. Coca Cola is an example of a firm using 
VaR. On its 10-K filing for fiscal year ending December 31, 2004, it reported that it used a historical simulation 
model to compute the VaR and it was 95% certain that the maximum loss for the fair values of its foreign currency 
derivatives and other financial instruments for the next week would not exceed $17 million, $26 million, and $34 
million using 2004, 2003 or 2002 average fair values.  
 
3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Guo (2003) looks at the effect of FRR. No. 48 on risk and the cost of capital in the debt market.  Her 
research includes firms that chose VaR and sensitivity analysis for disclosure, and looks at whether the information 
content provided through the additional reporting requirements lead to lower default risk and cost of debt.  Guo 
looks at 59 firms that issued new debt subsequent to providing risk disclosure information as mandated by FRR No. 
48 and concludes that changes in bond default risk and cost of debt are negatively, but insignificantly, associated 
with market risk disclosure.  Guo finds that firms choosing VaR for market risk disclosure have a significantly lower 
cost of debt and bond default risk than firms using sensitivity analysis, and firms that use hedging strategies 
effectively have lower bond default risk and cost of debt capital. 
 
Jorion (2002) examines the VaR presentation of 8 U.S. commercial banks by comparing the trading VaR 
disclosed by the banks in the sample to the subsequent variability of trading revenues.  Results suggest that VaR 
disclosures are indicative of subsequent variability of trading revenues. Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam, and 
Welker (2000) study the effect of FRR No. 48 on trading volume and stock returns.  They look at a sample of 222 
non-financial firms using sensitivity analysis, VaR, and tabular format for disclosure.  They find positive trading 
volume sensitivity to absolute changes in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates and commodity prices prior 
to the effective of FRR No. 48.  After FRR No. 48 became effective, they find declines in trading volume sensitivity 
to these market rates and commodity prices.  They conclude that FRR No. 48 provides useful information to 
investors and thus leads to a reduction in trading volume sensitivity to changes in rates and commodity prices. 
 
Thornton and Welker (2002) study the effect of FRR No. 48 on the stock return sensitivity of firms to 
changes in commodity prices.  Their sample includes only oil and gas firms.  They compare the sensitivity of firms’ 
equity price changes to commodity prices, known as beta-shifts, to a matched-sample firms that do not disclose 
information.  They show that the sample of firms that disclose have significantly greater beta-shifts after disclosing 
than those do not disclose over the same time period.  They conclude that FRR No. 48 provides useful information 
to investors in assessing the relationship between commodity prices and equity price changes. 
 
4.  DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
To obtain information on how firms report their market risk, we first construct our sample firms by 
choosing firms that appear in the S&P 1,500 over the years 2000-2004. The original sample contains 5,304 firm year 
observations, which is reduced to 4,791 by excluding 513 financial institution observations.  We examine 10-Ks for 
fiscal years 2002-2004 in order to determine disclosure compliance under FRR No. 48; the examination results in 
the elimination of 576 firm year observations resulting from lack of 10-K information due to mergers, buyouts, or 
bankruptcies. 
 
Data for estimating the CAPM and three-factor model were collected from Professor French’s website (at 
mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ ken.french/data_library.html).  We obtained financial data from Standard 
and Poor’s Compustat databases.  We obtained daily stock return information from CRSP. Information on the 
number of analysts following individual firms was obtained from the I/B/E/S database.  We require firms to have the 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2010 Volume 26, Number 4 
38 
necessary data in the Compustat, CRSP, and IBES database to be included in our sample.  Our final sample consists 
of 3,018 firm year observations. 
 
5.  METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1  Measuring firm’s risk 
 
We measure a firm’s risk as total risk, cost of equity, measured by the CAPM and the Fama and French 
three-factor models, and firm specific risk. As in Guay (1999) total risk is measured as the annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by 252
1/2
.   
 
To estimate the cost of equity using the CAPM model, we run the following regression using daily returns 
to obtain the slopes bi 
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where  
 
Ri = the return for firm i 
Rf = the return on one-month Treasury bill 
Rm = the return of value-weight market portfolio on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks 
 
Since we use daily returns, we include one lead and one lag terms in addition to the contemporaneous term 
into the regression to adjusted for biased betas estimated by non-synchronous trading as the method originally 
proposed by Dimson (1979) and modified by Fowler and Rorke (1983). We obtain the market beta by summing the 
coefficients estimates on the contemporaneous, one lead, and one lag of the corresponding risk premiums.  
Following Fama and French (1997) and D’Mello and Shroff (2000), we estimate the cost of equity by substituting 
the regression slope and arithmetic average daily, Rm – Rf returns from July 1963 until the year-end date into 
equation (1), and then multiplying by 252 days. 
 
We also estimate the cost of equity by using the Fama and French three-factor model as there is now a long-
established and well-known literature noting that beta alone cannot explain the cross-sectional variation in average 
stock returns.  For example, Chan, Chen, and Hsieh (1985) found that size captures the default risk that is 
compensated in returns. Chan and Chen (1991) document that small firms are more sensitive to market conditions, 
which leads to the differential risk exposures and returns between small and large firms.  Fama and French (1992, 
1993) demonstrate that three factors: beta, book-to-market ratio, and size, explain the cross-section of returns much 
better than the beta alone.  
 
To estimate the cost of equity by using the Fama and French three-factor model, we run the following 
regression by using daily returns to obtain the slopes: bi, si, hi. 
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Ri, Rm, and Rf are as defined for equation (1). SMB is the difference in returns between small-stock and large-stock 
portfolios and HML is the difference in returns between high book-to-market and low book-to-market portfolios. 
Following the method described in the CAPM model, we obtain each beta (market, SMB, and HML betas) by 
summing the coefficients estimates on the contemporaneous, one lead, and one lag of the corresponding risk 
premiums. We estimate the cost of equity by substituting the regression slopes and arithmetic average daily, Rm – Rf, 
SMB, and HML returns from July 1963 until the year-end date into equation (2) and then multiplying by 252 days. 
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In addition to total risk and the cost of equity, we also estimate risk by using firm specific risk, which is 
computed as the annualized standard deviation of residuals from the CAPM and three-factor models multiplied by 
252
1/2
. 
 
5.2   Multivariate framework 
 
To examine the relationship between the method for reporting market risk exposure and the risk measures, 
we estimate a fixed-effects model which controls for unobservable industry and time effects. Since Emm, Gay, and 
Lin (2007) find the tabular method reveals more information to the public, followed by sensitivity, and VaR, we 
compare other methods to sensitivity to investigate whether other methods decrease or increase the risk more than 
sensitivity analysis.  Following Botosan (1997) and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), we specify the relation 
between the risk and reporting method as follows: 
 
Riski,t = Intercept + VaRi,t + Tabi,t +  VaR & other Method(s) i,t + Sen & Tabi,t + Leveragei,t + Book-to-Marketi,t+  
Analystsi,t + Sizei,t + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies    (3) 
 
where risk is one of the three measurements: total risk, cost of equity, measured by the CAPM or Fama and French 
three-factor models, and firm specific risk. We then include several dummy variables for firm reporting methods 
into equation (3) to investigate the relationship between different reporting methods and firm’s risk exposures. VaR 
in equation (3) is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm uses VaR as its disclosure method. Tab indicator 
variable is equal to 1 if the firm uses tabular format. VaR & other method(s) indicator variable is equal to 1 if the 
firm uses VaR and other method(s). Sen & Tab indicator variable is equal to 1 if the firm uses sensitivity analysis 
and tabular. We compare each indicator variable with the intercept which catches our base case, sensitivity. 
 
Leverage, used as a proxy for default risk, is defined as long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term 
debt divided by total assets.  We expect leverage to be positively correlated with the risk measurements. B/M is the 
book-to-market ratio, used as a proxy for growth opportunities, and is measured by the ratio of book value of equity 
to the market value of equity.  The book-to-market ratio is expected to be positively related to the risk measurements 
as firms with high book-to-market ratios are expected to have fewer opportunities for growth.  We use the number of 
analysts following the firms to proxy for asymmetric information. Since a higher number of analysts following a 
firm should reduce the level of asymmetric information, we expect the number of analyst to be negatively related to 
risk measurements.  Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and is expected to be negatively related 
to the risk measurements. We also include industry, defined at the two-digit SIC code level, and year dummies into 
equation (3) to control for unobserved industry and time effects. 
 
6.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of risk measures for different reporting methods chosen by firms.  
We find the majority of the firms chose sensitivity followed by tabular. We also find firms choosing VaR have on 
average lower cost of equity than firms choosing other reporting methods.  Firms choosing sensitivity have higher 
total risk and firm specific risk than firms choosing other reporting methods.  
 
We observe that firms in a particular industry are more likely to select a particular reporting method. For 
example, VaR is the most common reporting method for utility industry. Industry may play an important role in 
firm’s reporting method selection. We therefore perform the univariate tests on a matched-pair sample. We match 
firms using methods other than sensitivity with firms using sensitivity by year, industry, defined at 2-digit SIC code 
level, and then firm size if there is more than one firm using sensitivity in that particular industry. Table 3 presents 
the mean and median difference of each risk measure between firms using methods other than sensitivity and firms 
using sensitivity.  We find firms using the combination of VaR and other method(s) (76% of the firms using VaR 
and sensitivity in this category) have higher total risk, market risk, and firm specific risk than firms using sensitivity. 
We also find firms using sensitivity and tabular have higher total risk and firm specific risk than firms using 
sensitivity alone. 
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Table 2 Univariate Statistics of Risk Measures 
This table displays summary statistics of the risk measurements for firms choosing different reporting methods. Risk measures include the total risk, the cost of equity, and firm 
specific risk. Total risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by 2521/2. Cost of equity is measured by Fama and French three-factor and CAPM 
models. Firm specific risk is the annualized standard deviation of residuals from the Fama and French three-factor and CAPM models multiplied by 2521/2.  
 
Reporting Methods Number of Observations Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Sensitivity 2,346 0.4144 0.3692 0.1216 0.1039 0.1003 0.0731 0.3466 0.3073 0.3599 0.3171
VaR 76 0.3317 0.2693 0.1003 0.0791 0.0820 0.0697 0.2735 0.2109 0.2813 0.2157
Tabular 327 0.3987 0.3600 0.1275 0.1100 0.1025 0.0814 0.3316 0.3027 0.3445 0.3105
VaR & Other Method(s) 84 0.3325 0.2660 0.1427 0.1231 0.0913 0.0769 0.2831 0.2153 0.2953 0.2224
Sensitivity & Tabular 185 0.3901 0.3352 0.1334 0.1053 0.1018 0.0754 0.3260 0.2766 0.3387 0.2882
Total Risk Cost of Equity Firm Specific Risk
CAPM Three-Factor Model CAPMThree-Factor Model
 
 
 
Table 3 Matched-Sample Tests of Risk Measures and Reporting Method Chosen 
This table shows the mean and median difference of each risk measure for firms choosing reporting methods other than sensitivity over sensitivity based on a matched-pair sample. 
The matched sample is constructed by matching by year, industry, defined at the two-digit SIC code level, and firm size. Risk measures include the total risk, the cost of equity, 
and firm specific risk. Total risk is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by 2521/2. Cost of equity is measured by Fama and French three-factor and 
CAPM models. Firm specific risk is the annualized standard deviation of residuals from the Fama and French three-factor and CAPM models multiplied by 2521/2. The symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Reporting Methods
Number of
Observations
Mean 
Difference
Median 
Difference
Mean 
Difference
Median 
Difference
Mean 
Difference
Median 
Difference
Mean 
Difference
Median 
Difference
Mean 
Difference
Median 
Difference
VaR 76 -0.0125 -0.0458 ** -0.0021 -0.0127 -0.0053 0.0005 -0.0132 -0.0431 ** -0.0137 -0.0455 **
Tabular 304 -0.0120 -0.0099 0.0011 0.0034 0.0022 0.0019 -0.0127 -0.0075 -0.0146 -0.0121
VaR & Other Method(s) 84 0.0727 ** 0.0348 *** 0.0212 ** 0.0207 ** 0.0048 * 0.0055 * 0.0699 *** 0.0301 *** 0.0714 *** 0.0332 ***
Sensitivity & Tabular 177 0.0359 ** 0.0211 ** -0.0037 -0.0006 0.0056 * 0.0028 * 0.0301 ** 0.0121 ** 0.0305 ** 0.0129 **
Three-Factor Model CAPM
Firm Specific RiskTotal Risk Cost of Equity
CAPMThree-Factor Model
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While the above analysis gives an indication of total risk, cost of equity, and firm specific risk for firms 
using each method of disclosure, it does not control for firm characteristics that have been empirically shown to 
affect risk.  Table 4 presents results of the regression of total risk on the method of disclosure chosen by the firms.  
We find that firms using the VaR method as well as the combination of VaR and other method(s) have significantly 
higher total risk than firms using sensitivity.  Most firms that use VaR are utility companies and typically they use 
derivatives for both trading and non-trading purposes.  The resulting information revealed by the firm is often 
considered to be somewhat confusing and difficult to understand.  Investors may thus require a higher return 
because of difficulty understanding the information provided and because of possible estimation errors resulting 
from the information.  We also find that firms that choose tabular have lower total risk than firms that choose 
sensitivity analysis but this result is not statistically significant.       
 
 
Table 4 The Relationship between Total Risk and Reporting Method Chosen 
This table presents results for fixed-effects estimation of the total risk on the reporting method chosen by the firms. The 
dependent variable is total risk which is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by 2521/2. VaR 
indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses VaR. Tabular indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses tabular. VaR & 
Other Method(s) indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses VaR and other methods. Sensitivity & Tabular indicator 
variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses sensitivity and tabular methods. Leverage is measured by (long-term debt + current portion 
of long-term debt)/total assets. Book-to-Market Ratio is book value of total equity to market value of total equity. Number of 
Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. The regression 
also includes industry dummies and year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Intercept 0.5366*** 
 (0.0343) 
VaR indicator variable 0.0601*** 
 (0.0180) 
Tabular indicator variable -0.00665 
 (0.0092) 
VaR & Other method(s) indicator variable 0.0639*** 
 (0.0178) 
Sensitivity & Tabular indicator variable 0.01351 
 (0.0117) 
Leverage 0.2228*** 
 (0.0203) 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.1290*** 
 (0.0094) 
Number of Analysts 0.0041*** 
 (0.0003) 
Size -0.0664*** 
 (0.0030) 
Number of observations 3,018 
R2 0.4595 
 
 
 Table 5 shows the relationship between the cost of equity and the reporting method chosen by firms. Using 
the Fama and French three-factor model, we find that firms using VaR and other method(s) to report risk exposures 
have significantly higher cost of equity than firms using sensitivity analysis.  We also find that firms using tabular as 
well as the combination of sensitivity and tabular methods have a lower (but insignificantly so) cost of equity when 
estimated by the three-factor model than firms employing sensitivity analysis.  
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Table 5 The Relationship between the Cost of Equity and Reporting Method Chosen 
This table presents results for fixed-effects estimation of the cost of equity on the method chosen by the firms. The dependent 
variable is cost of equity measured by Fama-French three-factor model or CAPM. VaR indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm 
chooses VaR. Tabular indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses tabular. VaR & Other Method(s) indicator variable is 
equal to 1 if a firm chooses VaR and other methods. Sensitivity & Tabular indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses 
sensitivity and tabular methods. Leverage is measured by (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets. Book-
to-Market Ratio is book value of total equity to market value of total equity. Number of Analysts is the number of analysts 
following the firm. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. The regression also includes industry dummies and 
year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Three-Factor Model  CAPM 
Intercept 0.1960***  0.2090*** 
 (0.0138)  (0.0090) 
VaR indicator variable 0.00662  0.0002 
 (0.0073)  (0.0048) 
Tabular indicator variable -0.00156  0.00003 
 (0.0037)  (0.0024) 
VaR & Other method(s) indicator variable 0.0158**  0.00115 
 (0.0072)  (0.0047) 
Sensitivity & Tabular indicator variable -0.0019  0.00158 
 (0.0047)  (0.0031) 
Leverage 0.0759***  0.0290*** 
 (0.0082)  (0.0054) 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.0373***  0.0108*** 
 (0.0038)  (0.0025) 
Number of Analysts -0.0003**  0.0008*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Size -0.0080***  -0.0088*** 
 (0.0012)  (0.0008) 
Number of observations 3,018  3,018 
R2 0.4206  0.6897 
 
 
Finally, we look at the relationship between firm-specific risk and the methods used by the companies.   
The results are presented in Table 6.  We find that firms using VaR and the combination of VaR and other method(s) 
have higher firm-specific risk than firms using sensitivity analysis. A firm’s total risk includes market risk and firm-
specific risk and we find a positive relation between VaR and total risk and fail to find a significant relation between 
VaR and the cost of equity. This result indicates that the higher total risk associated with using VaR is attributable to 
higher firm-specific risk rather than market-related systematic risk.  Firms using VaR and other method(s) have 
higher total risk, market risk and firm specific risk than firms using sensitivity.  Finally, we find firms using tabular 
have lower firm specific risk than firms using sensitivity although this finding is not statistically significant.   
 
 
Table 6 The Relationship between Firm-Specific Risk on Method Chosen 
This table presents results for fixed-effects estimation of the firm-specific risk on the method chosen by the firms. The dependent 
variable is firm-specific risk, which is the annualized standard deviation of residuals from the three-factor and CAPM models 
multiplied by 2521/2. VaR indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses VaR. Tabular indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm 
chooses tabular. VaR & Other Method(s) indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses VaR and other methods. Sensitivity & 
Tabular indicator variable is equal to 1 if a firm chooses sensitivity and tabular methods. Leverage is measured by (long-term 
debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets. Book-to-Market Ratio is book value of total equity to market value of total 
equity. Number of Analysts is the number of analysts following the firm. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
The regression also includes industry dummies and year dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Three-Factor Model  CAPM 
Intercept 0.4958***  0.5234*** 
 (0.0318)  (0.0329) 
VaR indicator variable 0.0611***  0.0623*** 
 (0.0167)  (0.0173) 
Tabular indicator variable -0.00793  -0.00817 
 (0.0085)  (0.0088) 
VaR & Other method(s) indicator variable 0.0626***  0.0647*** 
 (0.0165)  (0.0171) 
Sensitivity & Tabular indicator variable 0.01179  0.01193 
 (0.0109)  (0.0112) 
Leverage 0.2196***  0.2287*** 
 (0.0188)  (0.0195) 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.1209***  0.1278*** 
 (0.0087)  (0.0090) 
Number of Analysts 0.0034***  0.0035*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Size -0.0630***  -0.0664*** 
 (0.0028)  (0.0029) 
Number of observations 3,018  3,018 
R2 0.4162  0.4241 
 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
 We analyze the association between firm’s choice of reporting methods in compliance with FRR No. 48 
and total risk, the cost of equity, and firm specific risk.  Based on our regression results, we find that firms using 
VaR have significantly higher total risk and firm specific risk than firms using sensitivity.  Firms using the 
combination of VaR and other method(s) (76% of the firms use VaR and sensitivity in this category) have higher 
total risk, market risk, and firm specific risk than firms using sensitivity. Conversely, firms employing tabular 
generally have (insignificantly) lower total risk, the cost of equity estimated by the Fama and French three-factor 
model, and firm specific risk than firms using sensitivity.  That is because tabular disclosure has to reveal more 
detail information to enable analysts to derive the alternative sensitivity and VaR metrics.  Surprisingly, we fail to 
find a negative relation between our risk measures and the combination of tabular and sensitivity methods. 
 
 Overall, we find firms choosing VaR or VaR and other method(s) have higher risk. However, the causation 
could be other way around, i.e. firms with higher risk may like to choose a method which reveals less information to 
the market such as VaR. Testing the causation is beyond the scope of this paper, but it could be an interesting topic 
for future research.  
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Exhibit 1 Tabular example: The Kroger Co. 
 
(Source: The Kroger Co. 10-K filing for the fiscal year ended January 29, 2005) 
 
The tables below provide information about our interest rate derivatives and underlying debt portfolio as of 
January 29, 2005. The amounts shown for each year represent the contractual maturities of long-term debt, 
excluding capital leases, and the average outstanding notional amounts of interest rate derivatives as of January 29, 
2005. Interest rates reflect the weighted average for the outstanding instruments. The variable component of each 
interest rate derivative and the variable rate debt is based on U.S. dollar LIBOR using the forward yield curve as of 
January 29, 2005. The Fair-Value column includes the fair-value of our debt instruments and interest rate derivatives 
as of January 29, 2005. Refer to Notes 8, 9 and 10 to the Consolidated Financial Statements:   
 
     
Expected Year of Maturity 
   
     
2005 
   
2006 
   
2007 
   
2008 
   
2009 
   
Thereafter 
   
Total 
   
Fair-Value 
   
  (In millions)  
Debt                                                           
Fixed rate    $ (46 )  $ (545 )  $ (524 )  $ (992 )  $ (384 )  $ (4,181 )  $ (6,672 )  $ (7,471 ) 
Average interest rate     7.10 %   7.07 %   7.00 %   6.93 %   6.87 %   6.85 %         
Variable rate    $ —   $ (9 )  $ (1 )  $ (6 )  $ (710 )  $ (107 )  $ (833 )  $ (833 ) 
Average interest rate     2.91 %   3.59 %   3.88 %   4.09 %   4.16 %   3.72 %         
  
 
                                
     
Average Notional Amounts Outstanding 
   
     
2005 
   
2006 
   
2007 
   
2008 
   
2009 
   
Thereafter 
   
Total 
  
Fair Value 
   
     (In millions)   
Interest Rate Derivatives                                   
Variable to fixed    $ —   $ —   $ —   $ —   $ —   $ —   $ —  $ —   
Average pay rate                                   
Average receive rate                                   
Fixed to variable    $ 1,375   $ 1,251   $ 1,050   $ 363   $ 300   $ 300   $ 1,375  $ (11 ) 
Average pay rate     6.29 %   6.99 %   7.06 %   5.24 %   4.82 %   5.75 %         
Average receive rate     6.98 %   6.90 %   6.74 %   5.38 %   4.95 %   4.95 %         
 
 
Exhibit 2 Sensitivity example: Best Buy Co., Inc. 
 
(Source: Best Buy Co., Inc. 10-K filing for the fiscal year ended February 26, 2005) 
 
Our debt is not subject to material interest-rate volatility risk. The rates on a substantial portion of our debt 
may be reset, but may not be more than one percentage point higher than the current rates. If the rates on the debt 
were to be reset one percentage point higher, our annual interest expense would increase by approximately $4 
million. We do not currently manage the risk through the use of derivative instruments.  
 
We have market risk arising from changes in foreign currency exchange rates as a result of our operations 
in Canada. At this time, we do not manage the risk through the use of derivative instruments. A 10% adverse change 
in the foreign currency exchange rate would not have a significant impact on our results of operations or financial 
position.  
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2010 Volume 26, Number 4 
46 
Exhibit 3 Value at Risk example: The Coca Cola Company 
 
(Source: The Kroger Co. 10-K filing for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004) 
 
We monitor our exposure to financial market risks using several objective measurement systems, including 
value-at-risk models. Our value-at-risk calculations use a historical simulation model to estimate potential future 
losses in the fair value of our derivatives and other financial instruments that could occur as a result of adverse 
movements in foreign currency and interest rates. We have not considered the potential impact of favorable 
movements in foreign currency and interest rates on our calculations. We examined historical weekly returns over 
the previous 10 years to calculate our value at risk. The average value at risk represents the simple average of 
quarterly amounts over the past year. As a result of our foreign currency value-at-risk calculations, we estimate with 
95 percent confidence that the fair values of our foreign currency derivatives and other financial instruments, over a 
one-week period, would decline by less than $17 million, $26 million and $34 million, respectively, using 2004, 
2003 or 2002 average fair values and by less than $18 million and $28 million, respectively, using December 31, 
2004 and 2003 fair values. According to our interest rate value-at-risk calculations, we estimate with 95 percent 
confidence that any increase in our net interest expense due to an adverse move in our 2004 average or in our 
December 31, 2004 interest rates over a one-week period would not have a material impact on our consolidated 
financial statements. Our December 31, 2003 and 2002 estimates were not material to our consolidated financial 
statements.  
 
